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THE CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT AND THE WORLD 
Ralf  Michaels* 
Some sixteen years ago, on the occasion one of  many symposia on the possibility of  a new Restatement on 
Conflict of  Laws to replace the much-derided Second Restatement, Mathias Reimann suggested that a new 
Restatement should focus on the requirements of  what he called “the international age.”1 Conflict of  laws is 
increasingly international, he pointed out. This remains true today—just recall that three of  the four recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction concerned international conflicts.2 A new Restatement must 
take that into account. Reimann formulated three very sensible wishes for drafters of  a new Restatement: they 
should consider every rule and principle they formulate with international disputes in mind; they should work 
comparatively; and they should include foreign advisers.3 
Now that a Third Restatement is underway, we can see that the third of  Reimann’s wishes, the one for foreign 
advisors, has been ignored completely by the American Law Institute (ALI). Not a single member of  the Ad-
visers group is situated outside the United States (though some have a foreign educational background). Within 
the (self-selected) members consultative group, only four scholars are based abroad.4 This is in sharp contrast 
to the Foreign Relations Restatement, which can rely on an international advisory panel with twenty-one mem-
bers from all around the world. It is to be feared, therefore, that Reimann’s first two wishes also can be fulfilled 
only incompletely—even though the current draft displays in some sections ample comparative and interna-
tional materials.5 
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1 Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement—For the International Age, 75 IND. L.J. 575 (2000). Similarly, Symeon Symeonides, A New 
Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?, 5 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 383, 401-03 (2009). 
2 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011) (English defendant with a U.S. distributor); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (foreign defendants; accident in France); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
The fourth, domestic, case was Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
3 Reimann, supra note 1, at 583-88. 
4 Andrea Bjorklund (Montreal); Richard Garnett (Melbourne); Catherine Kessedjian (Paris); Bea Verschraegen (Vienna). 
5 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 (Aug. 12, 2016) (hereinafter “Draft”) § 1.04 
cmt. a (“Consideration has also been given to foreign codifications, particularly choice-of-law codes, and the practice of  foreign courts”), 
§ 2.01 Reporter’s note 1 (“For example, the concept of  habitual residence has gained significant acceptance throughout U.S. law as well 
as international and supranational law and the law of  other countries”); § 5.01 cmt. e (listing recent codifications worldwide). Concrete 
comparative references are spread around the current draft. Cf., by contrast, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 10 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“The rules in the Restatement of  thus Subject are derived, unless otherwise indicated, from cases 
with elements in one or more sister States. These interstate cases provide most of  the relevant authority”); Reimann, supra note 1, at 
576-77. 
156 AJIL UNBOUND Vol. 110 
 
In what follows, I address some general themes in this regard, to supplement Reimann’s proposals. I address 
why the rest of  the world matters for a Conflicts Restatement. I discuss challenges for the current draft’s 
method, in view of  the subject’s internationalization. I mention some concrete areas in which an internationalist 
perspective could be instructive. And I make two concrete proposals for how to address internationalization in 
the Restatement. 
The Importance of  the Rest of  the World 
Why should the rest of  the world matter for a Restatement? The Restatement, one might suggest, restates 
U.S. law, not foreign law. And U.S. courts have, by and large, employed the same methods in addressing conflicts 
with foreign law that they have to interstate conflicts. Moreover, specific problems concerning international 
conflicts are dealt with in the Restatement of  the Law on Foreign Relations, which is also currently the subject 
of  a new ALI project. 
The reporters reject such parochialism in the current draft, at least in principle.6 They are right to do so for 
at least five reasons. The first concerns the nature of  Restatements in general. Restatements have three func-
tions: to describe the law as it is, to suggest the best rules for adoption, and to prescribe actually applicable law.7 
For the latter two functions—the determination of  the best law—a comparative perspective seems almost 
indispensable. Other Restatements, like the one on agency, have used comparative law, too.8 One might have a 
different view regarding the descriptive function. But, even here, a comparison seems helpful, if  only to show 
what is truly peculiar about U.S. law. More importantly, the descriptive function has always played a slightly 
lesser role for Restatements in conflict of  laws than in other areas, and for a good reason: Courts, left to their 
own devices, tend to favor their own law over that of  other states,. Such a preference for home law is suspicious 
from a broader perspective, at least to some degree. It is for these reasons that the Second Restatement ignored 
the homeward trend that was discoverable in existing case law and instead formulated “the needs of  the inter-
state and international systems” as the first of  its choice of  law principles—precisely because these needs were 
underappreciated in existing case law. 
A second reason is that the form of  a Restatement—a quasi-codification—can draw on ample experience 
from foreign codifications of  conflict of  laws, which Symeon Symeonides discusses in his recent invaluable 
book.9 U.S. conflict of  laws has, apart from its earlier Restatements, relatively little experience with codification, 
with the exception of  codifications in Louisiana and Oregon (and the unenacted code for Puerto Rico). If  only 
for technical drafting issues, foreign law can here be of  immense value. 
A third reason, this one peculiar to the discipline, is that conflict of  laws, perhaps more than other disciplines, 
has always developed as through interchange between different countries. U.S. conflict of  laws in the nineteenth 
century was deliberately comparative, beginning with Livermore’s and Joseph Story’s engagement with Euro-
pean sources, and going on at least until Joseph Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement. It was only during 
legal realism and the so-called conflict-of-laws revolution that U.S. conflicts law became inward-looking. At the 
same time, the rest of  the world keenly observed the U.S. conflicts revolution and adapted its own approaches 
 
6 Draft, supra note 5, § 1.04; for a list of  factors, see id. cmt. d. The promise, id. that “differences have been accommodated, where 
necessary, by the explicit articulation of  different rules for the interstate and international context” has not yet, as far as I can see, been 
implemented. Some Reporters’ notes do make clear distinctions, however. See, e.g., § 5.08 Reporters’ note 2, p. 164 (certification of  
questions of  foreign law beyond U.S. State and federal courts); § 5.09 Reporters’ note 2 (discussing comparatively European approaches 
to insufficient information about foreign law). 
7 Ralf  Michaels, Restatements, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 1466 (Basedow et al. eds, 2012). 
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 7 (Introduction—Common Law and Statutes), 11-12 (Reporter’s Notes) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2006). 
9 See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD (2014). The draft draws on this book frequently. 
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to the field in light of  the experience.10 There is much to learn from these developments. And the reporters 
should, where possible, take into account that the Restatement provides guidance not just for U.S. lawyers but 
for lawyers around the world dealing with U.S. conflict of  laws. 
Fourthly, and relatedly, U.S. conflict of  laws necessarily interacts with foreign conflict of  laws in a way dif-
ferent from that in which, say, U.S. tort law interacts with foreign tort law. Even if  renvoi is rejected (as it is, 
mostly, in the current draft),11 foreign conflict-of-laws rules play an important role for parties’ agreements on 
choice of  law, on their strategic behavior (for example forum shopping),12 and so on. 
Finally, interstate transactions are importantly different from international transactions. Differences between 
state and foreign nation laws are greater than differences between sister state laws. The Constitution applies 
only in part to such conflicts. On the other hand, only international transactions are influenced by international 
law and by foreign relations and foreign commerce considerations.13 Greater geographical distances influence 
relevant policy considerations. Specific problems—of  differences in language or currency, for example—occur 
only in international conflicts.  
Method  
What follows from internationalization for the method of  the Restatement? Conflict of  laws in the United 
States has long been keenly interested—one might say obsessed—with issues of  method. That this has not 
always served the field well can be gleaned from the earlier Restatements of  the field. The First Restatement 
relied on a method—the vested rights theory—that had, at the time of  its adoption, already been shown to be 
circular and unwieldy, and that led to results that were in accordance with neither existing case law nor interests 
and policies.14 However, if  the problem of  the First Restatement was the over-determinacy of  a questionable 
method, the Second Restatement suffered from the opposite problem. Drafted in the midst of  the conflict-of-
laws revolution, the Restatement attempted to combine many of  the existing methods, including both territo-
riality and interest analysis, in a Section 6(2) entitled “Choice-of-Law Principles,”15 and asked courts, explicitly, 
to take these considerations into account when applying each of  its specific provisions. The resulting “mish-
mash”16 left the courts without clear guidance, even though some of  the specific provisions in the Second 
Restatement are better than its reputation.  
It is against this experience that the drafters of  the new Restatement attempt to take a pragmatic and meth-
odologically modest approach, which seems very welcome.17 Indeed, what judges need from a Restatement are 
operational rules, not deep jurisprudential theories or a selection of  broad and vague factors to be considered. 
At the same time, rules are impossible without an underlying foundation. The current draft chooses as such 
grounding an approach to choice of  law that is widespread in the United States (though not anywhere else): 
 
10 For Europe, see Peter Hay, European Conflicts Law After the American “Revolution”—Comparative Notes, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2053. 
11 Draft, supra note 5, § 5.04. 
12 Ralph U. Witten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559 (2002). 
13 The current draft does not, unfortunately, contain a provision on international law limits on choice of  law. See Draft, supra note 5, 
at xxvii. It does suggest, though without discussion, that its rules comply with international law. See id. § 1.01, cmt. e. See also, Christopher 
A. Whytock, Toward a New Dialogue Between Conflict of  Laws and International Law, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 150 (2016). 
14 Symeon C. Symeonides, The First Conflicts Restatement through the Eyes of  Old: As Bad as its Reputation?, 32 SO. ILL. L. REV. 39 (2007). 
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
16 William A. Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of  Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1983). 
17 But see, for a contrary view, Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, 2015 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 1999, 2001 n. 
3 and passim. 
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interest analysis (though it also points out that other considerations than governmental interests are relevant).18 
The Restatement adopts a “two step test” advocated earlier by its main reporter:19 In a first step, the scope of  
application of  each state’s law must be determined on the basis of  each state’s interests in application in the 
concrete case. In a second step, eventual conflicts between overlapping laws must be resolved through “rules 
of  priority.” After the method was introduced in the first draft almost in passing,20 the current draft now con-
tains a more elaborate discussion of  its methodological approach. Although the test is not explicitly mandated 
in a specific rule, the draft suggests that its rules “have been derived through the two-step process . . . by 
positing the likely scope of  state laws in light of  their likely or generally accepted purposes and then attempting 
to determine the most appropriate law by identifying the state with the dominant interest.”21 
In my view, interest analysis creates several problems as the basis for a Restatement. Here, I want to focus 
only on those having to do with internationalization. First, interest analysis works badly with foreign nation 
laws, which frequently do not give any guidance as to their scope of  application, whether explicitly or implicitly. 
The scope is, in foreign nation laws, frequently expressed only through choice of  law rules, which the current 
draft rejects as criteria for determining scope.22 This is a consequence not just of  different approaches to choice 
of  law but also, relatedly, different ideas about the role of  private law. The idea that private laws express gov-
ernmental interests remains relatively alien to many foreign nations. The distinction between loss-allocating and 
conduct-regulating tort rules for example, central not only to interest analysis but also to the current draft,23 is 
mostly anathema to European thinking, which essentially treats all tort rules as loss-allocating and only provides 
a small area of  application for “rules of  safety and conduct.”24 As a consequence, an approach focused on such 
interests must, in view of  foreign nation laws, frequently remain hypothetical. 
A second problem exacerbates the first one. Historically, interest analysis emerged from the U.S. Constitution. 
Even after it was translated into a choice-of-law approach, its main proponents—from Brainerd Currie and 
Herma Hill Kay through William Baxter and Larry Kramer to Louise Weinberg and Kermit Roosevelt—assign 
an important role to the U.S. Constitution, if  not as basis for conflict of  laws then at least to remedy excesses 
of  the theory. But the Constitution cannot play this role well in international cases, because its most important 
provisions for conflict of  laws, including the Full Faith and Credit Clause, are inapplicable. Should comity, that 
vague doctrine, be expected to play a similar role?25 Or should excesses in international conflicts remain un-
remedied? 
 
18 Draft, supra note 5, § 5.01 (“The process of  formulation and reexamination of  [rules of  choice of  law] requires consideration not 
only of  the specific policies of  the relevant internal law rules but also of  the general policies relating to multistate occurrences and 
policies relating to the predictable and efficient conduct of  litigation and the structuring of  out-of-court behavior.”) 
19 Draft, supra note 5, at xiv-xxi, § 5.01 Reporter’s note on cmt. b; § 5.02 cmt. a, c; KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-2 
(2010). 
20 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) CONFLICT OF LAWS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 1, (AM. LAW INST., Oct. 1, 2015), § 5.01 cmt. b 
and Reporter’s note to cmt. b. 
21 Draft, supra note 5, § 5.02 cmt. c. 
22 Id. at xvii-xviii. 
23 Id. § 6.01 cmt. a, § 6.04 cmt. a. 
24 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome 
II”), at 12, COM (2003) 427 final (July 22, 2003) (“Article 3(1), which establishes an objective link between the damage and the applicable 
law, further reflects the modern concept of the law of civil liability which is no longer, as it was in the first half of the last century, 
oriented towards punishing for fault-based conduct: nowadays, it is the compensation function that dominates, as can be seen from the 
proliferation of no-fault strict liability schemes.”); Parliament and Council Regulation 864/2007 of July 11 2007, on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), art. 17, 2007 O.J. (L 199), 40, (“In assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, 
account shall be taken, as a matter of fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct which were in force at the 
place and time of the event giving rise to the liability”). 
25 Donald Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of  Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010). 
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It should not be forgotten that Currie, the first proponent of  interest analysis, opposed the formulation of  
abstract choice-of-law rules for a good reason: interest analysis is quite anathema to such rules.26 It is too early 
to tell how the draft will resolve possible tensions between the method based on concrete subjective state 
interests and the desire for objective generalized rules. Here, it will be helpful to use comparisons with foreign 
codes (in addition to those of  Louisiana and Oregon). Internationally, some foreign lawmakers have translated 
experiences from the U.S. conflicts revolution into their own respective approaches. Some (not all) foreign 
codifications incorporate considerations of  policy (both domestic and international) without adopting a fully-
fledged interest analysis. This should be instructive. 
Concrete Areas 
What does internationalization mean for specific areas? Ultimately, this can be determined only by following 
Reimann’s first wish, namely to answer this question for each individual rule and principle. In what follows, I 
list some issues in which such inquiry could be fruitful. 
A first step is to ask, concretely to what extent differences in actually applicable background rules and prin-
ciples between the international context, as compared to the interstate context make a difference. On the one 
hand, treaties govern areas of  conflict of  laws especially in family matters; these treaties are inapplicable as 
between states. On the other hand, international conflicts are not under the same umbrella of  constitutional 
and federal law as domestic cases. The recognition and enforcement of  foreign nation judgments, for example, 
occurs under comity; the Full Faith and Credit Clause of  the U.S. Constitution applies only to U.S judgments. 
Consequently, requirements and functioning are very different in the international and interstate contexts. Forum 
non conveniens operates differently in the international realm, in large part because transfer is possible only be-
tween federal courts, not between a U.S. court and a foreign nation court. Questions on foreign law cannot be 
certified to a foreign nation court because no such mechanism exists yet on an international level, except for 
individual memoranda of  understanding like the one between New York and New South Wales.27 
But there may be subtler differences. A first set concerns considerations of  foreign relations. Take, for ex-
ample, the law of  personal jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court had once 
essentially required only minimum contacts and fairness. In Asahi, an international case, the Court added the 
requirement that jurisdiction be reasonable.28 That requirement was justified at least in part by foreign relations 
considerations.29 Maybe this reasonableness requirement should therefore, as Linda Silberman has suggested, 
be confined to international conflicts?30 By contrast, if  jurisdiction is about horizontal federalism, as some argue 
(somewhat dubiously),31 must it not be treated differently in international cases? 
A second set of  questions are those that occur in international disputes but that find no place in the Restate-
ment of  Foreign Relations because, strictly speaking, they are matters of  private, not public, international law. 
For example, how do we deal with parties who negotiate in different languages? What happens when exchange 
rates change dramatically? Who is responsible to acquire possibly necessary public permissions from agencies 
in countries without market economy?  
 
26 But see, Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999. 
27 Draft, supra note 5, § 5.08 Reporter’s note 2, p. 164. 
28 Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
29 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 403 (AM. L. INST. 1987). 
30 See Linda J. Silberman, “Two Cheers” For International Shoe (and None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of  International Shoe, 
28 U.C. DAVIS L.J. 755, 760. 
31 Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around Horizontal Federalism Rather Than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 769 (2015). 
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A third set of  questions concerns situations in which international experience is richer from interstate expe-
rience. Here, we can learn a lot. Take, for example, party autonomy for choice of  forum and choice of  law 
agreements. In the United States, discussions still often revolve only around the fundamental question whether, 
and under what circumstances, such agreements are enforceable at all.32 Internationally, it appears that we see 
far more sophisticated instruments and discussions: asymmetric agreements, enforcement agreements, penalty 
clauses for breach of  agreements, choice of  nonstate law, and so on.33  
Fourthly, foreign nation laws contain institutions that are unfamiliar in U.S. law. Foreign nations have a num-
ber of  types of  family relations—polygamous marriages, weak adoption (kafala), and the like—that need to be 
properly addressed. Institutions in foreign law perform functions that fall between those known in U.S. law. 
Take only, for example, the mahr—the money an Islamic husband has to pay (or promise) his wife. The mahr 
concerns validity requirements of  marriage, questions of  marital property, questions of  succession law, and 
questions of  postdivorce support. Courts should find guidance on how to address such institutions in the 
conflict of  laws. 
Finally, the mere geographic and cultural differences between different nations make international conflicts 
different from interstate conflicts, which may have concrete consequences. For example, determining the con-
tent of  foreign nation law creates bigger problems than that of  sister states.34 In many countries, official and 
unofficial law differ widely. Civil wars, like the one in Syria, mean that the official state law is no longer applied 
in areas of  the law. The law applicable to a political refugee establishes a problem greater than choosing between 
the country of  origin and the country of  destination as domicile:35 he may not want to stay in the new country, 
but the old country that persecuted him may often be unattractive, too.  
Conclusion 
The new Conflict of  Laws Restatement provides an exciting opportunity to provide courts with much-
needed guidance in conflict of  laws. This would be done best in the Restatement in two ways. First, each 
concrete provision in the Restatement should contain at least one comment that discusses whether the rule 
applies differently to international conflicts. Where differences are substantive enough, they should be listed in 
the rule itself. Second, in light of  these detailed analyses, the comments to Section 1.04 (Interstate and Interna-
tional Conflict of  Laws) should be much more detailed than they currently are. They should provide guidance 
to judges who are indeed confronted with international conflicts and need to know how to handle them. 
The reporters seem eager to rectify the existing parochialism of  conflict of  laws in the United States, and 
the current draft shows great promise in this regard. They will need assistance for this. Those among us, whether 
in the United States or abroad, who are able to provide such assistance, should stop complaining about a per-
ceived U.S. parochialism and come to help.36 In this way, the Third Restatement will help U.S. conflict of  laws 
to reengage again with the World. 
 
32 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 32, 43, 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
33 For English law (which may be leading in this area), see only ADRIAN BRIGGS, AGREEMENTS ON JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF 
LAW (2008); RICHARD FENTIMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION (2d ed. 2015). 
34 For discussion, see especially the concurrent opinions by JJ. Posner and Wood in Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 
624, 628 (7th Cir. 2010). 
35 Draft, supra note 5, § 2.08 Reporter’s note 3. 
36 The Duke Journal of  Comparative and International Law will organize, on November 4-5, a conference on the topic of  “Interna-
tionalizing the Conflict of  Laws Restatement.” Participants will include all three reporters as well as Patrick Borchers, Hannah Buxbaum, 
Donald Earl Childress III, Ann Laquer Estin, Richard Fentiman, Horatia Muir Watt, Mathias Reimann, Linda Silberman, Symeon 
Symeonides, Louise Ellen Teitz, and myself. 
